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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE
PHYSICALLY DISABLED: MYTH
AND REALITY
ALEXANDER J. BOLLA, JR.*
When I consider how my light is spent
Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
And that one talent which is death to hide
Lodged with me useless, though my soul more bent
To serve therewith my Maker, and present
My time account, lest He returning chide,
"Doth God exact day-Labor, light denied [?]"
John Milton1
By 1652, at the age of forty-four, John Milton was totally blind. He
was a prolific literary craftsman of Renaissance England. Yet his attitudes
on blindness do not reflect those of his time. Milton's answer to his rhetori-
cal question is "no"; God does not require from man what he has not
equipped him to do. For God to exact day-Labor from man were He to
deny the necessary light would be unjust under any definition.
Justice is perverted when its intention is unachieved or, like Milton's
query, when its goals are frustrated by impossibility. In the latter case, to
say there is justice when it cannot occur is hypocrisy. Unfortunately, many
physically disabled persons face Milton's dilemma. This Article focuses on
the myth in distributive justice when it is applied to help the disabled over-
come their handicaps. The myth is that John Rawls's theory of distributive
justice2 creates greater access to the private marketplace when applied to
physically disabled persons in the workplace. The fact is that the theory
shrouds the reality that the private marketplace is dominated by theories of
economic utility and efficiency. All that applied distributive justice can de-
liver for the physically disabled is forced mainstreaming into the public sec-
tor only.
This Article has three parts: a synoptic view of distributive justice; the
assumed relationship of distributive justice to moral motivations for grant-
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; B.S., B.A.,
1968, J.D., 1970, Ohio State University. The author wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Robert Cothren (student member, American Blind Lawyers Association),
William E. Hom, and Sue Walker for their assistance.
1. On His Blindness, in AN ANTHOLOGY OF WORLD POETRY 1107 (M. Van
Doren ed. 1928).
2. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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in-aid programs, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;' and some attitudes
about the physically disabled as they emerge from applied distributive
justice.
Rawls's theory of distributive justice supposes that all who constitute
society, when placed behind a "veil of ignorance"4 (a hypothetical time
before each knows his place in society),' will prefer a set of arrangements
that improves the lot of the worst off in society; this assumes that each is
averting a risk.6 The choice evolves from one of two principles: 7 one re-
quires equality in the assignment of basic rights; the other holds that social
and economic equalities are just only if they result in benefits for everyone,
particularly the least advantaged.' Injustice occurs when equalities do not
benefit all.' There is no injustice, according to this theory, if a few earn
greater benefits, provided that the disadvantaged enjoy some
improvement. o
Two serial principles form the basis for distributive justice:'1 "All so-
cial values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of
self respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of
any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage."' 2 This concept of a
distribution of the primary goods in society does not limit or restrict the
numerous possibilities of inequality. When members of society give up a
right through distribution to the least advantaged, it is plausible that they
might be compensated by resulting social gain, improving everyone's posi-
tion'3 and resulting in justice, according to Rawls.
Rawls contrasts his theory of "justice with fairness" with utilitarian-
ism. 4 The essence of utilitarianism is "that society is rightly ordered, and
therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the
greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belong-
3. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C.).
4. J. RAwLs, supra note 2, at 12.
5. R. POSNER, AN EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 346 (2d ed. 1977).
6. Id at 349.
7. J. RAwLs, supra note 2, at 14.
8. Id at 14-15.
9. Id at 62.
10. Id at 15.
11. Id at 60. There are two "principles of justice":
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
Id
12. Id at 62, 303.
13. Id at 62.
14. Id at 52.
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ing to it."'" If justice, according to Rawls, is the protection of the equal
rights of all over a collective social good, he must supplant utility, which
requires some men to accept lower expectations so that others may receive
greater advantages.1
6
Finally, Rawls extends social contract theory to bargain and agree-
ment "on the principles of justice for the basic structure of society."17 This
agreement must precede any decision about background institutions which
form government." Thus, justice becomes the first virtue of social
institutions. 
19
Critics argue that the underlying principles of Rawlsian justice have no
relationship to socio-economic causation.2 ° Above all, the complex formu-
lations of his justice theory are "in the end a theory of pure distribution." 2'
The most important primary good in the Rawlsian distribution scheme is
self-respect or self-esteem-a realization of life goals.
2 2
Rawlsian distributive justice is praised for supplying a theoretical and
philosophical justification for previously unsupported political beliefs held
by many well-intentioned people.23 His work's widespread readership, ac-
claim, and attention are due largely to a substantial political creed built on
a theory of justice which is really a moral policy. 24 Vocational rehabilita-
tion is one area that distributive justice theory offers a philosophical justifi-
cation for political action.
National attention on rehabilitation began in 1918 with a proposal di-
rected toward veterans.25 In 1920, Congress passed an act promoting voca-
tional rehabilitation for persons disabled in industry or in any legitimate
occupation.16 This act, one of the country's oldest grant-in-aid programs, is
the progenitor of our recent rehabilitation schemes. Since the act became
law, over three million people have been rehabilitated, at a cost effective-
ness ratio ranging from 1:3 to 1:5.27 The political justification for these
appropriations, made during a time of national economic distress, was the
15. D. SCHAEFER, JUSTICE OR TYRANNY? A CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAwLS's
"THEORY OF JUSTICE" 21 (1979).
16. Id at 22. See J. RAwLS, supra note 2, at 178.
17. D. SCHAEFER, supra note 15, at 24.
18. J. RAwLs, supra note 2, at 11.
19. Id at 586.
20. R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWIS 202 (1977). See also Tushnet, Post Re-
alist Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 20 (1980).
21. R. WOLFF, supra note 20, at 210.
22. J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 440.
23. D. SCHAEFER, supra note 15, at 5.
24. Id at 9.
25. See Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918).
26. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (repealed 1973).
27. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2073, 2084-85.
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need to serve "a very needy portion of the population."2 As these pro-
grams expanded, critics charged that they failed to reach the most needy-
the severely handicapped.2 9 Rehabilitation programmers used ease-of-serv-
ice as a criterion for selecting the target population, excluding many who
were difficult to reach."0 The result was functional utilitarianism.
The goal of rehabilitation services is to improve the lives and the liveli-
hoods of those served." The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 mandates that the
target population include the most severely handicapped;3 2 this is a depar-
ture from utilitarianism and a switch to functional serving of the worst off.
Though Congress intended that the program remain vocationally oriented,
it recognized that some people were so severely handicapped that they may
never achieve employment. Nevertheless, the severely handicapped were
not to be denied services.3 3 If this new emphasis were placed into the
scheme of distributive justice, the Act's history would confirm that it bene-
fits all, while serving the worst off. Although the severely handicapped may
never be employed, providing services to them may free members of the
handicapped individual's family to return to employment. The result
would be increased tax revenues and a rise in the family's standard of liv-
ing. 4 These gains are collective benefits, realized consistently with the
Rawlsian model. Whatever the moral impetus, the social legislation is justi-
fiable independent of political beliefs.
Many well-intentioned people seek to force society (particularly the
economic sector) to mainstream the physically disabled into the private sec-
tor. Their arguments3 5 are based primarily on utilitarianism. Proponents
of forced private sector mainstreaming suggest expanding Title VII of the
28. Id at 10, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2085.
29. A "severe handicap" means
the disability which requires multiple services over an extended period of
time and results from amputation, blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy, cystic
fibrosis, deafness, heart disease, hemiplegia, mental retardation, mental ill-
ness, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, neurological disorders (in-
cluding stroke and epilepsy), paraplegia, quadriplegia and other spinal
cord conditions, renal failure, respiratory or pulmonary dysfunction.
29 U.S.C. § 706(12) (1976).
30. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2073, 2092-95.
31. Id at 10, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 2078.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(1) (1976).
33. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprthled in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2073, 2092.
34. Id, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2092-93. See Note,
Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit
Discrinination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 814, 825 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Yuckman, Employment Discrimination and the Visually Impaired, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 69 (1982).
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Civil Rights Act of 196436 to reach where the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
other legislation do not.3 7 The proponents' goals conform to the theory of
distributive justice:
However much mingled with talk about burden on com-
merce, however much buttressed with common law precedents
and founded in history, however much explicitly designed to strike
down discriminations based on race, color, religion, national ori-
gin and sex, however much a product of the modern-day civil
rights revolution, aimed principally at securing equal rights...,
the statutes of the states in their present form, the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the congressional debates and proceedings on it, and the
judicial opinions validating its constitutionality-all, implicitly
and explicitly, necessarily and unavoidably, are built upon a rec-
ognition of the absolute importance to the nation, community and
individual, of persons having, holding, and enjoying rights of ac-
cess to the community and to the public, quasi-public, and private
instrumentalities necessary to make those rights effective.38
It is unlikely that more-intrusive legislation would be welcomed by the
private sector; it would meet with intense resistance because of competing
economic theories. The reformer's cry is not one of justice so much as it is
one of fairness. This plea is compatible with distributive justice. According
to Rawls, "justice as fairness" operates to account for obligations distinct
from natural duties.3 9 The latter apply without regard to voluntary acts.40
For example, "we have a natural duty not to be cruel and a duty to help
one another [in a crisis], whether or not we have committed ourselves to
these actions."4 i Obligation, as we know it in classical contract theory, is
imposed on each individual and is "just" when the two principles of justice
are satisfied and the individual "has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the
scheme [of justice] or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to
advance his interests.",
42
The goal of the fairness argument is to obligate the private sector to
mainstream the physically disabled; through the scheme of distributive jus-
tice "we are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing
our fair share."'43 To do otherwise would unjustly enrich those receiving the
benefit, and forced mainstreaming would be necessary to avoid injustice.
An unsolved critical issue, however, is how to overcome the difficulty in
mainstreaming the physically disabled who are also victims of a social
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1976).
37. See tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World. The Disabled in the Law of Torts,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966).
38. Id at 850-51.
39. J. RAwLS, supra note 2, at 111.
40. Id at 114.
41. Id
42. Id. at 342.
43. Id at 343.
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handicap. "'A disability is a condition of impairment, physical or mental,
having an objective aspect that can usually be described by a physi-
cian. . . . A handicap is the cumulative result of the obstacles which disa-
bility interposes between the individual and his maximum functional
level.' ,4 The myths and misperceptions about the physically disabled so-
cially handicap them, imposing added burdens, only to be assumed away
by Rawls. A blind lawyer's status in the marketplace should be equal to the
sighted attorney's, but in reality his status is "a reflection of underlying atti-
tudes and assumptions concerning disability and of social policies based
upon those attitudes,"4 5 thereby imposing a handicap.
The impetus for this inquiry comes from interviews with lawyer-
recruiters. The recruiter asserts that a physically disabled lawyer, particu-
larly one who is blind, would be rejected by clients on the basis of dimin-
ished professional competency due to the physical disability. This
conclusion is based on the recruiter's perceptions of attitudes toward dis-
abled attorneys, an attitude supposedly held by the public. If this percep-
tion is correct, it is inevitable that the private sector is virtually closed to
voluntary mainstreaming of the physically disabled attorney. But if the at-
titudes are misperceived by recruiters, as the following study reveals, they
become myth and, like their predecessors,4 6 need debunking.
Distributive justice begins with selective benefit. By identifying the
worst off, we choose those most needing help to overcome barriers in equal
opportunities; this theory applied gives helpful direction to rehabilitation
programs. The Rawlsian idea that we choose behind the veil of ignorance
calls for objectivity to rule out our own biases based on experience or indi-
vidual position. Rawls's first situation, before the veil is lifted, is hypotheti-
cal and cannot be easily simulated by the researcher.4 7 Therefore, the
following assumption premises the attitude survey: those without a physical
disability are more likely to approximate the position behind the veil when
ranking worst off within the group of the disabled.
The consumers of legal services and private sector lawyer-recruiters
polled in our survey48 categorized the blind as the worst off among the
44. tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of We/fare, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
809, 814 (1966) (quoting B. HAMILTON, COUNSELING THE HANDICAPPED IN THE
REHABILITATION PROCESS 17 (1950)).
45. Id. at 814.
46. Other unfounded myths include that: (1) insurance rates will skyrocket,
(2) adjustment to the workplace will involve considerable expense, (3) the com-
pany's safety record will be jeopardized, (4) handicapped people will not be as
productive as unimpaired workers. HERMANN & WALKER, HANDBOOK OF EM-
PLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED: SECTIONS 503 AND 504 OF THE REHA-
BILITATION ACT OF 1973, at 5-6 (1978).
47. See Howe & Roemer, Rawlsian Justice as the Core of A Game, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 880, 880-81 (1981).
48. The author conducted a survey during the winter of 1983. Populations
surveyed included: (1) 100 lawyer-recruiters, (2) 200 non-lawyers (general public),
[Vol. 48
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physically disabled. This is due largely to the degree they perceived the
blind person's dependency upon others. Each group majority also believed
that the blind should receive financial aid if benefits were limited to only
one category of disability, correlating their attitudes with those they identi-
fied as the worst off.
Those in the public population felt that society would benefit if the
disabled were taught to care for themselves, including employment train-
ing, underscoring a basic principle of Rawls's justice. Yet, the recruiter
population viewed society as prejudiced against hiring the disabled because
of the amount of workplace disruption that would be caused. This research
further indicates that if the private sector were required to hire a disabled
lawyer, the lawyer-recruiters would least prefer a blind attorney because of
their deep concern for the possible disruption of the workplace. In sum, the
perceptions that the lawyers attribute to society are really their own atti-
tudes, and not those of the general public. The latter group, given the same
choice, indicated they would least prefer to hire a mute lawyer.
The lawyer's perception of public attitudes that the disabled lawyer's
professional competency is greatly diminished by his disability is not widely
held and can be labeled myth. Of those polled who had consulted a lawyer,
84% believed or held out the possibility that blind attorneys could have
successfully handled their cases. Eighty-seven per cent of the same group
responded in a like manner about a blind lawyer handling most legal mat-
ters. Finally, a majority of the lawyers conceded that firm clients may view
the firm hiring a disabled attorney with little or no dismay. This view is, no
doubt, correct.
Whatever shortcomings are conjured in the pragmatic use of distribu-
tive justice theory, it serves as a useful matrix for studying attitudes toward
the physically disabled. This limited study shows how assumptions without
foundation plague legal thought.
Nevertheless, economic efficiency guides the private marketplace and
there is little incentive, moral or legal, practical or theoretical, to draw this
sector to employ the physically disabled attorney. According to distributive
justice theory, the result is everyone's problem; yet practically, it is no one's
to solve. Some are stimulating private placement through consortium ef-
(3) 27 blind law students, and (4) 147 members of the American Blind Lawyers
Association. Although populations (3) and (4) were surveyed nationwide, the bias
of groups (1) and (2) may be limited to the Southeast, so further national study is
warranted. The author adopted the following value of attitude surveys: "In forcing
attitudes into a scale some restructuring is done to the thought process. Attitude
scales should be regarded only as the roughest approximation of the way in which
attitudes actually exist in the personality of individuals." F. Saunders, "Attitudes
Towards Handicapped Persons-A Study of the Differential Effects of Fine Vari-
ables" 3 (Ph.D. dissertation (1969), available in Florida State University Library).
The data from the study support the conclusion that the prejudice against handi-
capped lawyers lies with lawyer-recruiters rather than with the general public.
1983]
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forts,4 9 appealing to peer enforcement for voluntary mainstreaming.
A recent federal study of private employers and the handicapped re-
proaches forced mainstreaming, while lauding the virtues of the private
sector:
An emphasis on stringent enforcement, if undertaken, must be ac-
companied by the knowledge that it would change the climate of
current attitudes, which are fairly favorable and sympathetic to-
ward the disabled. A punitive approach might increase employ-
ment among firms currently hiring few disabled persons but this
must be weighed against the loss of good will and affirmative ac-
tion in many firms which are the result of favorable attitudes, in-
cluding the belief that handicapped workers are likely to be
extremely reliable and highly motivated. Since hiring the handi-
capped is good business and also has moral sanction in the belief
of employers, self-enforcement has many more advantages for
achieving government objectives that it may have with other
groups needing affirmative action.50
In deference to John Milton, light is not denied this generation: some
still choose darkness while lip-serving affirmative action and justice.
49. See Voorhees, Handicapped Lawyers and the Private Sector, 68 A.B.A. J. 1595,
1596 (1982).
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRA-
TION, A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES
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